I have been reading William Poundstone’s Labyrinths of Reason (1964) as part of my research. This book calls into question the nature of paradoxical reasoning, and I find it quite relevant in data collection (as well as dealing with inductive reasoning). There are several insightful cases Poundstone illustrates that demonstrate the flaws in making assertions without data and, equating them to facts. He lays out a mode of inductive reasoning  from the French philosopher Jean Nicod. Oxford Reference defines Nicod’s Criterion as such:

“…It requires that an instance of a generalization that all As are B provides a positive, confirming piece of evidence for the generalization; evidence of something that is neither A nor B is irrelevant to it, as is evidence of something that is B but not A. The principle is put under pressure by Hempel’s paradox, which apparently yields circumstances in which something that is neither A nor B may confirm the generalization” (oxfordreference.com).

On page 26 of Labyrinths, Poundstone breaks this down and applies Carl Hempel’s Raven Paradox to test out Nicod’s Criterion according to its very own principles:

“To put it in terms of black ravens, this says that  (a) sighting a black raven makes the generalization “All raves are black” more likely; (b) sighting a nonblack raven disproves the statement; and (c) observations of black nonravens and nonblack nonravens are irrelevant.”

It is the principle in which a generalization has confirming evidence. It is a bare-bones sense for induction. Evidence of something that is unrelated to the initial object, or subject proposed is irrelevant. An example of this would be to “prove” the validity of a raven generalization by making assertions about green apples. It logically does not add up. Nicod’s Criterion is fallible.

While Nicod’s principle is effective in gathering data, it is not broad enough. There is a clear paradox in logic when the contrapositive is addressed in to the statement “All ravens are black.” It would be “All nonblack things are nonravens.” This scrutinizes a fallacy inlogic that Nicod dismisses as irrelevant. Hempel’s assertion raises awareness that one can confirm more information (in context to ravens) without actually having to seek ravens. An example of this would be “The green apple is not black, therefore… not a raven!” It is not only the initial claim that is ‘confirmed’ through this, but its contrapositive as well. Also, single instances in repetition prove laws to be legitimate. I can drop a ball a million times, and each instance will prove the gravity real. So every instance I find a small bit of evidence, the hypothesis is confirmed, no matter how broad.