

Greek Epic Fragments: From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries B.C. Trans. M. L. West, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

⁷⁸ Jacoby, F. (1956), 'Hekataios', in F. Jacoby, *Griechische Historiker*. Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller Verlag, pp. 185–237. Cf. Aelian (1866), *Claudii Aeliani Varia Historia* (Vol. II). R. Hercher (ed.), Leipzig: Teubner, XIII, 20; Cicero (1928), *De re publica. De legibus [On the Republic. On the Laws]*. Trans. C. W. Keyes, Cambridge (Mass.) London: Harvard University Press, I, 1, 5. Of Hecataeus' two major works, *Periēgēsis* and *Genealogiai*, around 400 fragments are preserved. See: Hecataeus (1954), *Hecatei Milesii Fragmenta*. G. Nenci (ed.), Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

⁷⁹ Rancière, *The Names of History*, p. 47.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 96; Rancière, *Les Noms de l'histoire*, p. 193.

⁸¹ Rancière, *The Names of History*, p. 86.

⁸² For a comparison of literary and historical discourses, see: Todorov, T. (1981), 'Les catégories du récit littéraire', in *L'Analyse structurale du récit*. Paris: Seuil, 131–157, esp. pp. 134–138.

⁸³ Nikulin, D. (2008), 'Memory and history', *Idealistic Studies*, 38 (1/2), 75–90.

Chapter 5

¹ In *The Names of History*, Rancière identifies the distinctive voice of the conditional that underpins the history of Michelet. Michelet uses the conditional to give his images of the silent, mute subjects of history a logical structure: 'The only one who speaks is *the only one who would be able to speak*. The silent voice of the conditional is that which can come back to us only through the tombstone or the cries of the rocks: a voice without paper, a meaning indelibly inscribed in things, which one may read, which one *would be able to read* endlessly in the materiality of the objects of everyday life.' Rancière, J. (1994), *The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge*. Trans. H. Melehy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 57, his emphasis.

² One of the important features of Hegel's position on Romanticism is the explanation it provides of the lessening function of beauty as a criterion of fine art in the modern world. This situation arises for Hegel once art is no longer a venue for the presentation of the Absolute. In contrast, Rancière attempts to describe a pincer movement in which the loss of representation as a cogent normative practice of value able to determine topic and technique, on one side, together with an expansion of the field of aesthetic relevance itself on the other, show art to be a porous category. I have discussed this topic in more detail in Ross, A. (2007), 'The aesthetic anomaly: art, politics and criticism in recent European philosophy (from Adorno to Rancière)', *Theory@buffalo*, <http://wings.buffalo.edu/theory/archive/t@b11.html>, 11, 97–121.

³ This is the position that Rancière outlines in his paper: Rancière, J. (2002), 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes: emplotments of autonomy and heteronomy', *New Left Review*, 14 (March/April), 133–151.

⁴ See, for instance, the discussion in Rancière, J. (2007), *The Future of the Image*. Trans. G. Elliot, London: Verso, p. 89, which disputes the 'nihilistic' interpretation of Hegel's thesis regarding the 'end of art'.

⁵ See J. M. Bernstein's 'Movies as the great democratic art form of the modern world (notes on Rancière)', this collection; see also, for a recent discussion of Hegel, Rancière, J. (2010), 'The aesthetic heterotopia', *Philosophy Today*, 54, pp. 15–25

⁶ Hegel, G. W. F. (1993), *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Trans. B. Bosanquet and M. Inwood (ed.), London: Penguin, pp. 92–3.

⁷ As Heidegger comments: 'Hegel never wished to deny the possibility that also in the future individual works of art would originate and be esteemed. The fact of such individual works, which exist as works only for the enjoyment of a few sectors of the population, does not speak against Hegel but for him. It is proof that art has lost its power to be the absolute, has lost its absolute power. On the basis of such loss the position of art and the kind of knowledge concerning it are defined for the nineteenth century'. Heidegger, M. (1981), *Nietzsche: Volume I, The Will to Power as Art*. Trans. D. Farrell Krell, London: Routledge, p. 85.

⁸ Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, p. 96. This description of poetry provides a condensed version of Hegel's story of Spirit as the search for a ground in external material, until the inadequacy of such grounding leads to the self-grounding of spirit, which as self-grounding no longer needs the mediation of material forms. See Hegel, G. W. F. (1998), *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (Volume 1). Trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press, especially pp. 79–81 and pp. 100–105.

⁹ Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, pp. 594–5. The vocabulary of the unhappy consciousness belongs more straightforwardly to his discussion of symbolic art. Rancière praises the way that Hegel identifies the perpetual time lag between ways of life and their identification as 'art': 'Art lives so long as it expresses a thought unclear to itself in a matter that resists it. It lives inasmuch as it is something else than art, that is a belief and a way of life'. Rancière, 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes', pp. 133–151, 141. See also his approving comments on Hegel's before the fact riposte to the purism of modernism in Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, p. 89. It is from Hegel that the terms of the modernist debate regarding the exploration of the potential of material media and techniques are derived. The question of media and techniques arises once the purpose of art as the presentation of the absolute is lost. Rancière argues that Hegel's position is in fact at odds with modernist dogma. In keeping with the central place that 'words' have in his thinking, he points out that the modernist framing of art is a description in words. It does not make sense to reduce painting, for instance, to pigment on a surface. The surface of the image does not fit the purism of modernism because the image 'is not wordless, [it] is not without "interpretations" that pictorialize it ... When the surface is no longer split in two, when it is nothing more than a site for the projection of pigments, Hegel taught, there is no longer any art' (Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, p. 89). The life of art requires that art be something other than art. On the other hand, it is precisely this position that renders Hegel's 'spirit of forms' an inverted image of the aesthetic revolution: Hegel cancels the promise of the aesthetic revolution for a new life because he attempts to contain what Rancière views as the general features of aesthetic experience within artworks alone. It is clear that art is something other than art for Rancière because of the essential role that 'words' play not just in poeticizing the prosaic in literature, but in describing constellations of meaning in cinema and

painting. There are a number of problems that this focus on words introduces for Rancière's discussion of cinema. I have discussed some of them in Ross, A. (2009), 'The aesthetic fable: cinema in Jacques Rancière's "Aesthetic Politics"', *SubStance*, 38 (1), 128–151.

- ¹⁰ Rancière, J. (2004), *The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing*. Trans. C. Mandell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 5. Incidentally, this is the post-Kantian Idealist and Romantic legacy which Rancière also detects in Badiou: 'the Platonism of the aesthetic age ... lets the Idea come forth as passage within the sensible and lets art be its witness. It depends on the aesthetic identification of the Idea with the double difference that obtains both between thought and itself and between the sensible and itself, one which determines the passage of the Infinite within the finite'. Rancière, J. (2004), 'Aesthetics, inaesthetics, anti-aesthetics', in P. Hallward (ed.), *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*. London: Continuum, p. 223.
- ¹¹ Rancière discusses Hegel's aesthetics in some detail in Rancière, J. (1998), *La Parole muette, Essai sur les contradictions de la littérature*. Paris: Hachette Littératures, pp. 62–69; and Rancière, J. (2001), *L'Inconscient esthétique*. Paris: Galilée, pp. 63–5. The latter book also discusses succinctly what is involved in the idea of 'mute speech', pp. 33–43.
- ¹² Rancière, *The Future of the Image*, p. 89.
- ¹³ Rancière, 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes', p. 137.
- ¹⁴ Rancière, 'The aesthetic heterotopia', p. 24.
- ¹⁵ Rancière, 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes', p. 142.
- ¹⁶ He writes: '...the word Aesthetics, taken literally, is not wholly satisfactory, since "Aesthetics" means, more precisely, the science of sensation, of feeling ... We will ... let the word "Aesthetics" stand; as a mere name it is a matter of indifference to us, and besides it has meanwhile passed over into common speech. As a name then it may be retained, but the proper expression for our science is *Philosophy of Art* and, more definitely, *Philosophy of Fine Art*.' Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, p. 1.
- ¹⁷ See, on this point, Jacques Rancière's *La Parole muette* and *The Flesh of Words*. This position draws on the ambiguity of Plato's position in which the book is 'at once silent and too loquacious' (Rancière, J. [1991], *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Trans. K. Ross, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 38). In his *Phaedrus* Plato compares the 'solemn silence' of writing to the mute presence of a 'painting'. In the same breath he objects to the way that 'once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and of those who have nothing at all to do with it', and he insists that this democracy of the written word requires 'its father to help it; for it is incapable of either defending or helping itself'; see Plato, (2005) *Phaedrus*. Trans. C. Rowe, London: Penguin, p. 63, 275d1–e5. See Rancière's discussion of the innovation that occurs when the communication between the master and student is not mediated by a master-explicator but instead falls on the common link of the book: the book is that 'egalitarian link between master and student' (Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, p. 13).
- ¹⁸ See Rancière's discussion of this point in Rancière, J. (2008), 'Why Emma Bovary had to be killed', *Critical Inquiry*, 34 (2), pp. 233–248.

- ¹⁹ Rancière, 'Why Emma Bovary had to be killed', p. 242.
- ²⁰ Rancière, *The Flesh of Words*, p. 153.
- ²¹ Rancière, J. (1999), *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Trans. J. Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 60.
- ²² This version of Rancière's reformulation of Aristotle occurs in Rancière, J. (2004), *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. Trans. G. Rockhill, London: Continuum, p. 39. It is significant that the formulation he gives of this position in *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, qualifies that it is 'modern man' who is 'a political animal because he is a literary animal' (my emphasis). Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, p. 37. It should also be noted that this reformulation recalls Michel Foucault's statement in the first volume of his *History of Sexuality*: 'For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question'. Foucault, M. (1990), *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (Volume 1). Trans. R. Hurley, New York: Vintage Books, p. 143. See my comments on Foucault in the conclusion to this paper.
- ²³ The 'singular relationship between literature, philosophy and politics' involves this promise of passage between 'words' and 'worlds'. Deleuze, for instance, sees words opening the door of 'a people still to come'; Rancière, *The Flesh of Words*, p. 4.
- ²⁴ The reference to the 'account' made of speech occurs in Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, in particular, pp. 22–23, 40 and 82.
- ²⁵ In Rancière, J. (2004), 'The politics of literature', *SubStance*, 33 (1), 10–24, he writes: 'so-called interpretations are political to the extent that they are reconfigurations of the visibility of a common world', p. 23.
- ²⁶ Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, p. 65.
- ²⁷ In her introduction to her translation of *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, Kristin Ross presents Rancière's narrating of Jacotot's discovery of the 'equality of intelligences', after Jacotot's own use of the story device, as 'one of the concrete acts or practices that verifies equality'. This is because 'storytelling' is 'an act that presumes in its interlocutor an equality of intelligence rather than an inequality of knowledge', p. xxii. See also Rancière's presentation of Jacotot's method as a 'story', Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, p. 22. In the case of Rancière's treatment of Hegel we can say that the 'story' motif is used in a more classical sense as a way of lessening the hold of a particular account of modernity. The corollary is that, used this way, the story motif is also a way of qualifying Rancière's competing account as 'probable' rather than certain in all its particulars. See on this point, Rancière's discussion of his style in Rancière, J. and Hallward, P. (2003), 'Politics and aesthetics: an interview', *Angelaki*, 8 (2), 191–211, p. 208.
- ²⁸ Rancière, 'The aesthetic revolution and its outcomes', p. 142.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 145.
- ³³ Rancière, 'The politics of literature', p. 20.
- ³⁴ The principle of the so-called realistic novel is 'not reproducing facts as they are, as critics claimed. It was displaying the so-called world of *prosaic* activities as

a huge *poem* – a huge fabric of signs and traces, of obscure signs that had to be displayed, unfolded and deciphered'. It is a new conception of meaning that renders characters intelligible not through their ends and will, but 'through the clothes they wear, the stones of their houses or the wallpaper of their rooms'. Rancière, 'The politics of literature', pp. 18–19, my emphasis.

³⁵ Badiou, A. (2005), *Metapolitics*. Trans. J. Barker, London and New York: Verso, p. 107. He writes: '[t]he site for Rancière's enterprise is not internal to a system [*dispositif*] of knowledge ... For the point at issue is *never* (my emphasis – AR) being a member, *ex officio*, of any particular academic community, whilst consistently drawing on textual positivities.'

³⁶ See Foucault, M. (1988), *Politics Philosophy Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984*. L. D. Kritzmann (ed.), trans. A. Sheridan et al, London: Routledge, p. 310.

³⁷ See Rancière, J. (2005), 'Literary misunderstanding', *Paragraph*, 28 (2), 91–103. In this essay he distinguishes literature, which works on the disincorporation of meaning in 'individual units', from politics, which works on 'the whole', p. 99.

Chapter 6

¹ Rancière, J. (1991), *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Trans. K. Ross, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

² Bingham, C. and Biesta, G. (2010), *Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation*. London: Continuum.

³ Pelletier, C. (2009), 'Education, equality and emancipation: Rancière's critique of Bourdieu and the question of performativity', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 30(2), 137–150; and Pelletier, C. (2009a), 'Rancière and the poetics of the social sciences', *International Journal of Research & Method in Education*, 32 (3), 267–284.

⁴ A very different way of conceptualizing Rancière's 'untimeliness' is the argument that his work touches on issues characteristic of feminist interventions in education over the last twenty years, particularly feminist ethnography in education. This is not a criticism of his work but rather of the attention which a male French/continental philosopher manages to garner, in contrast to the ongoing work of feminist women researchers. In order to avoid reinscribing this dynamic, and also to examine how Rancière's writing might become a resource within feminist debates, I have, in previous work, explored the continuities and discontinuities between Rancière's writing and feminist writing. This exploration could go much further, particularly, I think, with regard to ideas of method and discipline. My focus in this chapter is on some more negative responses to Rancière's ideas in education.

⁵ Ross, K. (1991) 'Introduction', in J. Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

⁶ Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991), *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1996),