Placing Racial Stereotypes in Context: Social Desirability and the Politics of Racial Hostility

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Past research indicates that diversity at the level of larger geographic units (e.g., counties) is linked to white racial hostility. However, research has not addressed whether diverse local contexts may strengthen or weaken the relationship *between racial stereotypes and policy attitudes. In a statewide opinion survey, we find that black-white racial diversity at the zip-code level strengthens the connection between racial stereotypes and race-related policy attitudes among whites. Moreover, this effect is most pronounced among low self-monitors, individuals who are relatively immune to the effects of egalitarian social norms likely to develop within a racially diverse local area. We find that this racializing effect is most evident for stereotypes (e.g., African Americans are "violent") that are "relevant" to a given policy (e.g., capital punishment). Our findings lend nuance to research on the political effects of racial attitudes and confirm the racializing political effects of diverse residential settings on white Americans.*

More than half a century after Myrdal's (1944) seminal study of racism in America, social scientists continue to dispute the relevance of racial considerations in politics. Some evidence indicates that racial negativity remains a primary determinant of white Americans' attitudes toward a range of race-related policies, including affirmative action, welfare spending, and capital punishment (Federico 2004, 2005; Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Other research, however, suggests that broad political principles such as economic individualism, egalitarianism, and limited government have displaced racial antagonism as the primary determinants of whites' policy preferences and that race is of little contemporary relevance (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Wilson 1979; for a review, see Huddy and Feldman 2009; Sears et al. 2000). Looking past this dispute, we believe that any attempt to come to grips with the role of race in American politics must confront the more important challenge of identifying *specific circumstances* under which race is politically consequential. That is, racial negativity may provide the foundation for political preferences for some individuals or under certain conditions but be of little relevance for others or under different conditions. In this vein, research has suggested that the impact of racial negativity on whites' policy judgments may be most likely to occur in situations where priming or framing raises the salience and cognitive accessibility of racial perceptions and attitudes (Hopkins 2010; Huber and Lapinski 2006; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).

In the present study, we focus on racially diverse residential areas as a context which heightens the salience of race. In examining the impact of racial animus on policy attitudes, we focus on the political consequences of negative racial stereotypes, since they provide a direct assessment of negative racial views that are not confounded with political ideology (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). We unpack the political effects of living in a racially diverse area and identify two distinct ways in which it influences the political effects of racial negativity. First, we review research showing that living in a racially mixed area activates whites' racial attitudes and heightens the political salience of racial stereotypes. Second, we argue that the heightened political effect of race in racially diverse contexts is complicated by the existence of stronger egalitarian racial norms. Not all whites are susceptible to such norms, however, and the accurate measurement of negative racial attitudes is more difficult among those who feel normative pressure to present as racially egalitarian. We thus examine the interactive effect of racial diversity in one's local area and individual differences in the sensitivity to tolerant social norms to demonstrate that diverse areas activate racial attitudes in response to racial policy but that this effect is only visible among those least susceptible to egalitarian racial norms.

Our findings have implications for geographic heterogeneity in the nature of political conflict and state-level policy outcomes on race-related issues and for the determinants of the relative effectiveness of implicit versus explicit race-coded political messages.

Racial Context and the Impact of Stereotypes

One environmental factor that has been extensively studied as an antecedent of attitudes toward race-linked policies (and racial hostility in general) among whites is the racial diversity of a person's residential context. This variable has been most frequently conceptualized and measured in terms of the relative concentration of African Americans in one's residential environment, with the latter being operationalized in various ways at the city, county, neighborhood, and/or zip-code levels. Here, the general argument is that contextual diversity should have the main effect of amplifying racial hostility by increasing the salience of race (e.g., Rudolph and Popp 2010).

However, in practical terms, the effects of context are complex. On one hand, a long line of work suggests that whites who live in highly diverse metropolitan areas or counties—particularly those containing large concentrations of African Americans—may be more prone to racial negativity (Key 1949; see also Branton and Jones 2005; Giles and Buckner 1993; Glaser 1994; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998). Although this finding is notably robust, it is subject to certain qualifications. For example, studies suggest that the effect is strongest in contexts characterized by low status (Giles and Hertz 1994; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). On the other hand, in *smaller* geographic areas, such as zip codes, self-selection into specific areas and neighborhoods leads to weaker or even reversed findings, i.e., lower levels of racial negativity in contexts with increased racial diversity (Forbes 1997; Oliver 2010).

Importantly, this line of work almost completely ignores another potentially significant consequence of racial context, which we focus on here: the possibility that a diverse racial context may have *interactive as well as "main" effects* on whites' race-related policy attitudes by increasing individuals' reliance on racial beliefs when making judgments about policy issues. In an effort to fill this gap, we argue that diverse racial contexts may also have the effect of strengthening the relationship between whites' stereotypes about African Americans and their attitudes toward policies both directly (e.g., affirmative action) and indirectly (e.g., capital punishment) linked to race.

We believe that contextual racial diversity should do this by cognitively activating race-related perceptions. In our view, contextual diversity primes race to make race-related beliefs more cognitively accessible, leading whites who live in racially heterogeneous contexts to rely more heavily on racial stereotypes when forming attitudes toward racial policies. This should be most pronounced for stereotypes that best "fit" a policy issue. For example, the belief that blacks are "lazy" is particularly relevant to whites' judgments about policies designed to offset racial discrimination or provide economic assistance to blacks because it implies that black disadvantage is caused by their poor character rather than social injustices which require a collective policy response (Gilens 1999). Similarly, perceptions of blacks as "violent" should be particularly relevant to judgments about crime policy (Peffley and Hurwitz 2007). Thus, our expectation is that racial context will have its strongest moderating effects on the relationship between stereotyping and policy judgment when the content of a particular stereotype can be readily linked to concerns associated with a given policy issue (Gilens 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; see also Banaji, Hardin, and Rothman 1993; Hardin and Rothman 1997; Higgins 1996).

In sum, we argue that racial diversity in one's environment should function much like manipulations of

stereotype activation in experimental studies (e.g., Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). That is, racial context should make race more salient in a variety of ways: by highlighting race as a relevant social category, by making people more aware of group competition, or by increasing local media coverage of racial matters (Hopkins 2010). All things considered, this leads us to the following prediction: the impact of racial stereotypes with conceptually "relevant" content on whites' policy attitudes should be stronger in racially diverse contexts, i.e., those in which blacks represent a sizeable percentage relative to whites.

Social Desirability, Racial Perceptions, and Racial Policy Attitudes

The central prediction developed in this article, that racial stereotypes have greater influence on whites' political attitudes in diverse racial contexts, entails one further complication before it is put to an empirical test. This complication arises from the increasingly pervasive norm of racial tolerance that inhibits the open expression of negative racial stereotypes and other forms of racial negativity (e.g., Mendelberg 2001; Sears and Henry 2005). Simply put, as overt racism has become more unacceptable, white survey respondents have become less willing to endorse negative racial beliefs than in the past (Huddy and Feldman 2009). This is consistent with research suggesting that unpopular opinions are expressed more slowly than popular opinions in response to a broad range of survey questions, especially when those who hold unpopular positions know their positions are not widely shared (Bassili 2003). Indeed, there is evidence that this may reduce survey respondents' willingness to respond to racially sensitive questions at all, with nonresponse potentially masking white opposition to racial policies and black political candidates (Berinsky 1999; Gilens, Sniderman, and Kuklinski 1998; Kuklinski et al. 1997).

More importantly, though, these pressures may be stronger among individuals living in the same racially diverse settings that increase the cognitive accessibility and policy influence of racial stereotypes. This prediction is supported by research on race-of-interviewer effects in which white respondents evince less racial negativity when an interviewer is black rather than white (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson, 1988a, 1988b; Davis 1997a, 1997b; Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg 1991; Hyman 1954; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Similar effects are found—even at the implicit level—when participants believe they will interact with racial minorities (Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair

2001) and others who are likely to hold egalitarian racial views (Sinclair et al. 2005; see also Blanchard et al. 1994; Crandall and Eshelman 2003; Crandall, Eshelman, and O'Brien 2002; Crandall and Stangor 2005; Klein, Snyder, and Livingston 2004). Although these studies do not deal with racial context per se, they do suggest that a concomitant of racial diversity—the presence of individuals from one's own and other racial groups with presumed egalitarian racial views—may situationally heighten the norm of racial tolerance (Allport 1954; Pettigrew et al. 1982). Consistent with this argument, research suggests that diversity at the level of smaller geographic areas—where self-selection, contact, and interaction are more likely to produce tolerant racial norms—is typified by less racial hostility, as noted above (e.g., Forbes 1997).

We thus confront two opposing influences of a diverse geographic context: it increases the salience of race and potentially heightens the effect of stereotypes on race-related policy, *and* at the same time it evokes tolerant racial norms that may inhibit the expression of racial negativity. To disentangle these effects, we turn to psychological research on self-monitoring, which suggests that individuals are not equally susceptible to social norms—a point often overlooked in past political behavior research (Berinsky 2004). In that sense, white Americans who are relatively indifferent to social norms *and* who live in racially diverse areas provide the best test of whether contextual racial diversity primes racial stereotypes and heightens their political effects.

Self-Monitoring

Social psychologists have identified stable, broadly applicable individual differences in responsiveness to social desirability. In particular, the concept of *self-monitoring* was developed to capture individual differences in sensitivity to situational norms and is used to assess the extent to which people are motivated to adjust their attitudes and behavior to fit such norms (Snyder 1974, 1979; Snyder and Gangestad 1986). As identified by scores on the Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Snyder 1974; Snyder and Gangestad 1986), high self-monitors are chronically concerned with the appropriateness of their behavior and highly attuned to social context, seeking to adjust their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior on the basis of salient norms. In domains as diverse as close relationships, advertising, organizational behavior, and socialization, research consistently indicates that high self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to accurately perceive and respond to social cues and to tailor their attitudes and behavior to fit prevailing social expectations. Gangestad

and Snyder liken high self-monitors to "consummate social pragmatists, willing and able to project images designed to impress others" (2000, 531). By contrast, low self-monitors are relatively less concerned with how well their behavior fits a situation. Instead, they are guided by their inner dispositions; as a consequence, low self-monitors manifest greater consistency between their private beliefs and attitudes and public actions than do high self-monitors. Gangestad and Snyder argue that low self-monitors are "motivated to establish and protect reputations of being earnest and sincere, with no desire (or perhaps even ability) to construct false images of themselves" (2000, 533).

This suggests that low (vs. high) self-monitors may be more immune to the pressures of racially tolerant norms in diverse geographic areas. Terkildsen (1993) provides an intriguing example of how self-monitoring can be used to capture individual variation in sensitivity to social norms with respect to race. In her study, respondents varying in self-monitoring were exposed to information about one of three fictitious political candidates—a white candidate, a dark-skinned black candidate, or a light-skinned black candidate. Low self-monitors reacted as expected to the candidate's skin color, rating the dark-skinned candidate more negatively than the light-skinned candidate. Among high self-monitors, however, the ratings were reversed, and the dark-skinned candidate was viewed more positively. In related research, Berinsky and Lavine (2012) found that high (but not low) self-monitors shifted their support from Bush to Kerry in the 2004 presidential election as racial diversity (at the congressional district level) increased, supporting the claim that high self-monitors are especially sensitive to contextual norms. Our work builds on these and other studies on the political effects of self-monitoring (Berinsky 2004; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Lavine and Snyder 1996; Mendelberg 2001).

In the present study, self-monitoring should determine whether racial context has an impact on the relationship between stereotypes and race-related policy attitudes among whites. Because low self-monitors are less concerned than high self-monitors with social desirability, they are more willing to express negative racial views regardless of tolerant local norms; their racial stereotypes and racial policy views will thus be more tightly connected in racially diverse areas. In contrast, high self-monitors are likely to avoid the expression of negative racial perceptions in diverse contexts because they adhere to tolerant local norms. As a result, the priming effect of contextual diversity should be offset by the increased normative constraint produced by diversity, making it more difficult to observe policy racialization as a function of context among these individuals. Thus, we expect self-monitoring and racial context to interact to influence the preferences an individual expresses in racially diverse contexts. Racial stereotypes—even when relevant to a policy—should be related only weakly to whites' policy attitudes among high self-monitors, regardless of context.

Hypotheses

We pursue several goals in this study. First, we examine whether contextual racial diversity conditions reliance on negative racial stereotypes in formulating policy preferences among whites. We expect racial stereotypes to have a more marked influence on race-related policy preferences for whites living in diverse racial contexts—defined here as areas in which the proportion of the population in the area that is African American is high relative to the proportion of the population in the area that is white. Second, we expect this relationship to be further conditioned by one's level of self-monitoring. Among those high in self-monitoring, the impact of racial stereotypes on policy judgment will be more difficult to detect because these individuals are motivated to avoid expressing racial hostility or translating that hostility into policy attitudes. Among low self-monitors, the impact of stereotypes on policy judgment should be stronger in diverse contexts. Moreover, we expect that this pattern of effects will be most pronounced when a particular stereotype is especially relevant to the policy in question. For example, when predicting whites' attitudes toward policies directly aimed at rectifying black disadvantage, we expect the stereotype of blacks as lazy to interact with contextual diversity among low self-monitors; in contrast, when predicting attitudes toward capital punishment, we expect the stereotype of blacks as violent to have a greater effect on policy attitudes among low self-monitors in diverse contexts. Third, we predict that policy attitudes will appear less racialized among high self-monitors in diverse contexts because they have a tendency to express racial opinions that "fit" these environments, i.e., by providing tolerant or neutral answers or by opting out of answering stereotype questions altogether. We test these expectations by merging data on whites from a representative New York State opinion survey conducted in 2000 and 2001 with contextual data from the 2000 United States Census.

Methods

Participants

We draw on data from the New York State Racial Attitudes Survey (NYRAS), conducted as a random-digit-dial

telephone interview of New York State residents which was conducted in two stages: the latter part of 2000 and the fall/winter of 2001.[1] The second phase of data collection was added in order to boost the number of white respondents, and the two samples are merged. The analyses are based on 729 white, non-Hispanic, non-Asian respondents. The survey was conducted by Stony Brook University's Center for Survey Research. The cooperation rate was 54% (AAPOR COOP3; www.aapor.org).[2]

Measures

Racial Stereotypes. The survey assessed support for the stereotypes that blacks are lazy and violent (measured on 10-point scales, where 1 = "lazy" and 10 = "hard-working," and 1 = "not at all violent" and 10 = "very violent"). The lazy scale was recoded so that high scores denote stereotype endorsement. Both scales were then recoded to vary from 0 to 1 (lazy: $M = 0.49$, $SD = 0.16$; violent: $M = 0.47$, $SD = 0.20$).[3]

Political Predispositions. We control for several factors. Two questions commonly included in the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey tapping *egalitarianism* (i.e., worry less about equality and gone too far with equal rights) were combined to form a weak scale ($\alpha = .48$, $r = .31$). Two standard ANES items tapping *individualism* (i.e., blame self if don't get ahead and poor because they don't work hard) were also combined to form a scale ($\alpha = .49$, $r = .32$). Both individualism and egalitarianism were rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (individualism: $M = 0.41$, $SD = 0.27$; egalitarianism: $M = 0.55$, $SD = 0.29$). *Political ideology* and *party identification* were measured using the standard ANES 7-point format, recoded to vary from 0 to

1, with higher scores indicating greater conservatism and identification with the Republican Party (ideology: $M = 0.49$, $SD = 0.32$; party identification: $M = 0.48$, $SD = 0.34$). We also control for age, measured in years,[4] education (1 = bachelor's degree or greater, 0 = otherwise), and gender (1 = Female, 0 = Male).

Policy Attitudes. Respondents' policy attitudes served as the dependent variables in our main analyses. Attitudes toward three economic racial policies—housing integration, economic aid to blacks, and affirmative action—were assessed with multiple items. These were transformed to a standard normal distribution and averaged to form a single composite index of racial policy attitudes ($\alpha = .75$, $M = 0.46$, SD = 0.28). The index was rescaled to vary from 0 to 1, with low scores indicating support for policies benefiting African Americans. We also analyze attitudes toward crime policy by creating a scale with four items on capital punishment ($\alpha = .90$, $M = 0.58$, $SD = 0.41$). This scale was also rescaled to vary from 0 to 1, with high scores denoting support for capital punishment. Additional details can be found in the online appendix.

Racial Context. We are interested in context as an antecedent of both the cognitive accessibility of race and situational norms of tolerance and analyze racial context at the level of the respondent's zip code, using data from the 2000 U.S. Census (summary file 3).[5] Given the relatively high level of residential segregation contained within larger geographic units (e.g., metropolitan area or county), especially those that are racially diverse, we focus on zip-code diversity because it is more likely to reflect the everyday experience of proximity to members of other racial groups, which should heighten the salience of race.[6] Moreover, distinct norms of tolerance associated with diversity are more likely to be conveyed forcefully at the zip-code level through contact with neighbors and

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[1] We estimated all models with a variable corresponding to the stage of interview, which does not change the substantive results.

[2] The cooperation rate was calculated as the ratio of completes to completes, partials, and refusals. The overall response rate was 31% calculated as the ratio of completes to completes, partials, refusals, and no answers for numbers that were clearly households. A maximum of 15 attempts were made at each number.

[3] Interestingly, the two scales were virtually uncorrelated ($r = -.02$). This can be attributed to the fact that the items were worded in different directions; previous research also finds low zero-order correlations between positive and negative stereotype items in the absence of statistical corrections for systematic measurement error (which cannot be performed here due to the small number of items available in our survey; see Levine, Carmines, and Sniderman 1999). However, the correlation is more in line with expectations among low self-monitors (i.e., among respondents scoring below the 25th percentile of the self-monitoring scale), at $r = .13$ (for high self-monitors, i.e., those scoring above the 75th percentile of the scale, the correlation is negative, at $r = -.18$).

[4] Due to missing data, we imputed age using the variables shown in Table 1. The results were highly similar with 20 imputed datasets.

[5] We also rely on this level of analysis for practical reasons: the dataset does not have contextual information more fine-grained than the zip code of each respondent. The supplementary appendix also includes other measures of diversity, all yielding substantively identical results.

[6] An alternative interpretation is that media coverage accounts for our results. While plausible, this is an unlikely explanation for the findings, primarily because zip codes are much smaller geographical units than media markets. For instance, while Long Island contains many zip codes, it overlaps with the New York City area market, resulting in similar media environments. Controlling for local television media consumption in our models does not change our results.

local institutions (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Indeed, consistent with this notion, diversity is actually correlated with reduced intergroup hostility at lower-level units such as zip codes (Forbes 1997; Oliver 2010).[7]

Given the centrality of the black/white divide to American racial politics—and the fact that our policy items implicate stereotypes about African Americans—we follow other studies by operationalizing racial diversity in terms of the concentration of African Americans relative to whites in a given area. Specifically, *racial diversity* was defined by subtracting the proportion of white residents from the proportion of African American residents within each zip code.[8] Accordingly, we used data from the Census's zip-code tabulation areas (ZCTA) and the Census Bureau's calculation of the proportion of white and black residents within each zip code. We then merged the New York survey data with the 2000 Census data by respondent zip code. The racial diversity index ranges from a low of −0.99 in our sample, indicating a relatively homogeneous (white) zip code, to a high of 0.73, indicating relatively more African Americans to whites. In reality, very few whites in New York State live in a zip code with a greater percentage of blacks than whites, as reflected in a mean diversity index of −0.74 (standard deviation of 0.30). To facilitate interpretation of all models, we rescaled racial diversity to range from 0 to 1 so that high scores indicate that the proportion of African Americans in the zip code's overall population is higher relative to the proportion of whites in the zip code's overall population.[9]

Self-Monitoring. We used a subset of four items from the "other-directedness/self-presentation" subscale of the self-monitoring scale ("In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than

anything else"; "I'm not always the person I appear to be"; "Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time"; and "I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them"). These items express a concern with "displaying what others expect one to display in social situations" (Snyder and Gangestad 1986, 126) and assess respondents' ability and motivation to adjust their behavior to induce a positive reaction in other people. Respondents indicated the extent to which each item applied to them on a 4-point scale (1 = "a great deal"; 4 = "does not apply at all").[10] Scores on the four items were averaged and then rescaled to run from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating higher self-monitoring ($M = 0.29$, $SD = 0.22$, $\alpha = 0.64$).[11]

Results
The Political Impact of Negative Racial Stereotypes

Two models were estimated to explore the impact of black-white racial heterogeneity, self-monitoring, and racial stereotypes on whites' race-related economic and crime policy attitudes.[12] For each dependent variable, Model 1 includes the first-order effects of the independent variables, including the demographic and political controls. This allows us to explore whether low and high self-monitors and those who reside in more and less racially diverse zip codes differ in their level of opposition to racial policies. Model 2 tests our key hypotheses, assessing the existence of two three-way interactions between racial context, self-monitoring, and each of the two racial stereotypes. Since both of our dependent variables are measured as continuous scales, we estimate Models 1 and 2 using ordinary least squares (OLS) and present the estimates in Table 1.[13] With the exception of age, all

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[7] Note that this finding of decreased hostility in diverse zip codes does not conflict with our own hypothesis about the impact of racial diversity on policy attitudes. Rather than being interested in the *main effect* of zip-code diversity on race-related policy attitudes—as researchers like Oliver (2010) were—we are interested in the novel question of the *interactive effect* of diversity: its tendency to strengthen or weaken the impact of racial stereotypes on policy attitudes in conjunction with self-monitoring.

[8] We created a censored version of racial diversity by declaring all zip codes with proportionately more blacks than whites to assume the same value as zip codes with equal proportions of black and white residents. Censoring the variable in this way does not alter our substantive findings.

[9] In order to verify that our respondents perceived these differences, we compare diversity with two items: (1) "Are there any African Americans living in your neighborhood?" and (2) "Roughly what percentage of your neighbors are African Americans?" Participants were scored 0 if they answered "no" to the first question; otherwise, their score was based on the percentage indicated in the second item. The correlation between this measure and zip-code diversity was r = .34, p < .001.

[10] We used this format rather than the standard true/false response scale to obtain greater variance in the self-monitoring scale (for a similar approach, see Berinsky 2004; Berinsky and Lavine 2012).

[11] The four-item scale correlates well with a scale composed of the remaining "other-directedness" items of the self-monitoring scale (r = .41), as well as with the remaining items of the full 25-item self-monitoring scale (r = .25; these correlations were performed on data collected and published by Oyamot, Fuglestad, and Snyder 2010).

[12] We include alternative model specifications in the online appendix, all of which underscore the robustness of our results. Specifically, alternative measures of diversity and log-transforming the proportion-black minus proportion-white measure yield substantively identical results. These models are presented in Tables A5 through A10 in the supplementary appendix.

[13] Insofar as our observations are nonindependent within zip codes, the standard errors in our models may be incorrect. There are a

TABLE 1 The Political Consequences of Racial Diversity, Racial Stereotypes, and Self-Monitoring

	Racial Policy Opposition		Capital Punishment Support	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*
Egalitarianism	−0.14 (.04)***	−0.14 (.04)***	−0.14 (.06)**	−0.13 (.06)**
Individualism	0.19 (.04)***	0.17 (.04)***	0.22 (.06)***	0.22 (.06)***
Party ID (Republican)	0.04 (.03)	0.05 (.03)	0.08 (.05)	0.08 (.05)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.23 (.03)***	0.22 (.04)***	0.11 (.05)**	0.11 (.06)**
Black Lazy	0.16 (.06)***	0.22 (.06)***	0.16 (.09)*	0.18 (.10)*
Black Violent	0.06 (.05)	0.06 (.05)	0.09 (.08)	0.11 (.08)
Gender (Female)	−0.04 (.02)**	−0.04 (.02)	−0.10 (.03)***	−0.10 (.03)***
Education	−0.01 (.02)	−0.01 (.02)	−0.16 (.03)***	−0.16 (.03)
Self-Monitoring	−0.14 (.05)***	−0.13 (.05)	0.01 (.07)	0.01 (.07)
Age/100	0.09 (.06)	0.07 (.06)	−0.19 (.09)**	−0.19 (.09)**
Diversity (%Black-%White)	−0.01 (.06)	0.01 (.06)	−0.09 (.08)	−0.15 (.09)*
SM × Lazy	—	−0.47 (.23)**	—	−0.31 (.35)
SM × Violent	—	0.10 (.20)	—	−0.20 (.31)
SM × Diversity	—	0.78 (.25)***	—	−0.08 (.39)
Lazy × Diversity	—	0.30 (.31)	—	0.15 (.47)
Violent × Diversity	—	0.04 (.31)	—	0.45 (.48)
SM × Lazy × Diversity	—	−1.83 (.73)***	—	−0.87 (1.13)
SM × Violent × Diversity	—	1.15 (.80)	—	−2.42 (1.22)**
Constant	0.49 (.02)***	0.49 (.02)***	0.72 (.03)***	0.71 (.03)***
R^2	0.28	0.31	0.20	0.21
N	602	602	598	598

Note: With the exception of age (in years), all variables were scaled from 0 to 1. All continuous independent variables were mean centered. Entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Both dependent variables are scaled to vary from 0 to 1.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed.

continuous independent variables were rescaled to vary from 0 to 1 and mean centered to facilitate interpretation of regression coefficients.

White endorsement of the "lazy" stereotype significantly predicted opposition to racial economic policies ($b = 0.16$, $SE = 0.06$, p < 0.01) and capital punishment ($b = 0.16$, $SE = 0.09$, p < 0.10) in Model 1. We expect, however, that the political effects of stereotypes will vary additionally with geographic context. In diverse contexts where race is salient, content-relevant stereotypes should exert a stronger influence on white policy attitudes, especially among low self-monitors. This necessitates specifying a three-way *Self-Monitoring × Lazy × Diversity* interaction and a *Self-Monitoring × Vi-*

variety of solutions to this problem, including multilevel estimation and clustered standard errors. However, these models are equivalent to our OLS results, as there are very few participants nested within each zip code. Of the 729 white respondents in the study, there are 381 zip codes, with a mean of 1.99 participants in each zip code (median = 1, range = [1,10]). Thus, the two models we present in the supplementary appendix—a random intercept linear model and a model with standard errors clustered at the zip code—are nearly identical to the OLS model presented in the text.

olent × Diversity interaction, as well as all lower-order two-way interactions (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). We include these interactions in Model 2 and expect both three-way interactions to have a negative sign: as racial context grows more diverse, racial policy attitudes will depend to a greater degree on racial stereotypes among those at the lower end of the self-monitoring scale. The three-way interactions should also be contingent on the fit between stereotype and policy: the *Self-Monitoring × Lazy × Diversity* interaction should be most pronounced with respect to support for racial policies aimed at dealing with black disadvantage, whereas the *Self-Monitoring × Violent × Diversity* interaction should be most pronounced with respect to support for capital punishment. Indeed, in both equations, we find support for these expectations. For the racial policy scale, the three-way *Self-Monitoring × Lazy × Diversity* interaction is negative and significant ($b = -1.83$, $SE = 0.73$, p < 0.05); for capital punishment, the *Self-Monitoring × Violent × Diversity* interaction is negative and significant ($b = -2.42$, $SE = 1.22$, p < 0.05). These interactions indicate that negative racial stereotypes are more likely to

TABLE 2   **Effect of Stereotypes at Varying Levels of Diversity and Self-Monitoring**

Diversity (%Black-%White)		Self-Monitoring (10th percentile)	Self-Monitoring (25th percentile)	Self-Monitoring (75th percentile)	Self-Monitoring (90th percentile)
Racial Policy Opposition					
(10th percentile)	Lazy Stereotype	0.24 (.13)*	0.20 (.09)**	0.15 (.08)*	0.11 (.10)
(25th percentile)	Lazy Stereotype	0.26 (.12)**	0.21 (.09)**	0.15 (.07)*	0.11 (.09)
(75th percentile)	Lazy Stereotype	0.38 (.10)***	0.29 (.07)***	0.16 (.06)**	0.07 (.08)
(90th percentile)	Lazy Stereotype	0.55 (.13)***	0.40 (.11)***	0.17 (.08)**	0.03 (.09)
Capital Punishment Support					
(10th percentile)	Violent Stereotype	0.01 (.15)	0.03 (.11)	0.06 (.10)	0.08 (.14)
(25th percentile)	Violent Stereotype	0.03 (.14)	0.05 (.10)	0.06 (.11)	0.08 (.14)
(75th percentile)	Violent Stereotype	0.20 (.12)	0.15 (.09)	0.08 (.09)	0.04 (.11)
(90th percentile)	Violent Stereotype	0.44 (.20)**	0.31 (.16)*	0.12 (.14)	−0.01 (.15)

Note: Simple slopes analysis. Entries are slope coefficients for lazy and violent stereotypes; they represent the effect of each stereotype on the dependent variable, varying whether racial diversity is at the 10th, 25th, 75th, or 90th percentile and whether self-monitoring is at the 10th, 25th, 75th, or 90th percentile. The entries are based on simple linear combinations from Model 2 in Table 1. Entries in parentheses are standard errors.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed.

influence whites' racial policy attitudes among low than high self-monitors when diversity is high but not when diversity is low. As predicted, neither of the other three-way interactions is significant.[14]

To explicate these interactions, we simulated the effects of stereotypes at different levels of self-monitoring and black-white diversity based on analyses in Table 2, and we present the "simple slopes" for the violent and lazy stereotypes. At low levels of racial diversity (the 10th percentile of the distribution), the relationship between stereotypes and policy is relatively weak for both low and high self-monitors. As diversity increases, however, stereotypes exert a clearer impact on racial policy and crime policy attitudes. Moreover, as expected, the impact of stereotypes is stronger among low self-monitors and in cases of high stereotype "fit" (i.e., the lazy stereotype with racial policy and the violent stereotype with crime policy). For example, in racially diverse contexts (i.e., 75th and 90th percentiles of the diversity distribution), low self-monitors (10th and 25th percentiles of the self-monitoring distribution) who endorse the *lazy* stereotype are substantially more likely to oppose race-targeted policies than those who reject the stereotype. But this is not

the case among high self-monitors (i.e., those scoring at the 75th and 90th percentiles of the self-monitoring distribution) among whom stereotypes have little or no effect on opposition to racial policy attitudes regardless of local diversity. A similar pattern emerges for capital punishment. For low self-monitors in racially diverse contexts, the *violent* stereotype is positively related to support for capital punishment. Again, however, this is not the case among high self-monitors.[15]

We graphically depict the relationship between stereotypes at low and high levels of black-white racial diversity and self-monitoring in Figure 1. The solid line represents the stereotype slope for low self-monitors (10th percentile), while the dotted line depicts the same slope for high self-monitors (90th percentile); the 95% confidence interval around the point estimates for low self-monitors is shown in gray. The panels on the left represent low diversity (the 10th percentile), while the panels on the right represent high diversity (the 90th percentile). The figure demonstrates that the political consequences of stereotype endorsement depend simultaneously on racial heterogeneity and self-monitoring. Specifically, *stereotypes fail to predict policy attitudes for high self-monitors, irrespective of racial context.* The slopes for high self-monitors are flat in both homogeneous and

[14]There is also a positive two-way interaction between the lazy stereotype and zip-code diversity on support for the economic racial policy scale, indicating that at mean levels of self-monitoring, negative stereotypes increase opposition to the three racial policies. A similar positive two-way interaction exists between the violent stereotype and zip-code diversity on support for capital punishment. Once again, as expected, at mean levels of self-monitoring, those living in diverse (vs. homogeneous) zip codes are more likely to translate their negative racial stereotypes into support for capital punishment.

[15]We test whether the three-way interactions in Model 2 varied across racial policy and death penalty models. The three-way *Self-Monitoring × Lazy × Diversity* interaction does not significantly vary across models ($\chi^2[1] = 0.63$, $p < 0.43$); however, the three-way *Self-Monitoring × Violent × Diversity* interaction does significantly vary across models ($\chi^2[1] = 9.30$, $p < 0.01$), with a stronger impact in the high stereotype-fit case (i.e., the capital punishment model).

FIGURE 1 Effect of Stereotypes on Racial Policy Opposition and Capital Punishment Support

High=90th percentile; Low=10th percentile.

heterogeneous contexts. As the figure plainly shows, the effects are different for low self-monitors. At low levels of self-monitoring, the relationship between stereotype endorsement and policy attitudes is notably larger in racially diverse contexts than in homogeneous racial contexts.

In sum, these results indicate that the political effects of negative racial stereotypes are strong in diverse zip codes for whites who are least responsive to tolerant social norms (i.e., low self-monitors). Otherwise, when contextual diversity is low or among individuals who are comparatively more responsive to social norms (i.e., high self-monitors), racial stereotypes appear to have little political impact.

Racial Self-Monitoring?

One reason why policy attitudes may be disconnected from racial stereotypes among high self-monitors is that their beliefs about African Americans are more context sensitive than those of low self-monitors. This is consistent with psychological research indicating that high self-monitors behave like social chameleons; as Snyder explains, high self-monitors "take the pulse of their social

surroundings and adopt the public postures that convey just the right image of themselves" (1986, 33). In this section, we examine whether high self-monitors in diverse racial contexts systematically adjust their responses to stereotype questions. We test for evidence of this in several ways. First, self-monitoring may contribute to survey nonresponse, especially in contexts with high black-white diversity. That is, high self-monitors in racially heterogeneous contexts may simply "opt out" of answering racial stereotype questions. Second, high self-monitors living in racially diverse contexts may be more likely than low self-monitors to reject negative racial stereotypes. Third, self-monitoring may increase the propensity to choose the "safe," noncommittal midpoint of the racial stereotype scales, providing yet another way to avoid expressing racial negativity (Berinsky 1999). If high self-monitors adjust the expression of negative stereotypes in diverse contexts, it will make it more difficult to detect the racialization of race-related policy attitudes in such residential contexts.

We estimated several models to explore the context dependence of whites' endorsement of negative racial stereotypes. First, using OLS, we regressed responses to the lazy and violent stereotype items on background

TABLE 3 Testing the Self-Monitoring Hypothesis for the Lazy Stereotype

		Stereotype Blacks as Lazy		
		Multinomial Logit		
	OLS	Midpoint vs. Endorse Stereotype	Oppose vs. Endorse Stereotype	Opt Out vs. Endorse Stereotype
Egalitarianism	−0.02 (.02)	0.52 (.49)	0.86 (.50)*	2.19 (.68)***
Individualism	0.06 (.03)**	−1.27 (.54)**	−1.18 (.55)**	−1.97 (.73)***
Party ID (Republican)	0.06 (.02)**	0.15 (.43)	−0.33 (.43)	0.35 (.60)
Ideology (Conservative)	−0.01 (.02)	−0.18 (.45)	0.05 (.46)	−0.50 (.62)
Gender (Female)	0.01 (.01)	0.05 (.26)	−0.02 (.26)	−0.26 (.34)
Education	0.01 (.01)	−0.03 (.46)	−0.09 (.26)	0.67 (.34)**
Self-Monitoring	0.01 (.03)	−1.17 (.56)**	−0.70 (.56)	−1.78 (.80)**
Age/100	−0.07 (.04)*	−0.78 (.75)	−0.60 (.69)	−1.71 (1.04)
Diversity (%Black-%White)	0.02 (.04)	−0.84 (.68)	−0.69 (.69)	−0.27 (.91)
SM × Diversity	0.04 (.14)	3.45 (2.50)	1.32 (2.68)	5.33 (3.51)
Constant	−0.01 (.01)	1.30 (.23)***	1.23 (.24)***	−0.45 (.32)
R^2	0.04		—	
N	631		707	

Note: With the exception of age (in years), all variables were scaled from 0 to 1. All continuous independent variables were mean centered. The entries are OLS coefficients and maximum-likelihood coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the OLS column, high scores denote endorsing the stereotype.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed.

characteristics, self-monitoring, black-white racial context, and the interaction between self-monitoring and racial context. Evidence for tailored responding—i.e., moderating negativity amid racial diversity—is indicated by a negative interaction between self-monitoring and context. That is, high self-monitors should be more likely to reject stereotypes (i.e., choosing low-scale scores) as racial diversity increases. As the leftmost numerical column in Tables 3 and 4 indicates, this expectation receives mixed support. For the lazy stereotype (see Table 3), the interaction is not significantly different from zero; for the violent stereotype, the interaction is significant and correctly (i.e., negatively) signed ($b = -0.63$, $SE = 0.17$, p < 0.01), indicating that high self-monitors are decreasingly likely to report that blacks are violent as racial diversity increases. This interaction is graphed in Figure 2. As the figure shows, under high diversity, endorsement of the belief that blacks are violent *decreased* by about 20 percentage points as self-monitoring moved from its minimum to maximum value. At low diversity, by contrast, low and high self-monitors endorse negative stereotypes to more or less the same degree (the trend moves in the opposite direction).

We also looked at whether high self-monitors in diverse environments tailor their responses by opting out or

choosing the middle value of stereotype scales. To make the analysis manageable, we recoded responses to both stereotype items to create two new nominal variables with four categories: endorse the racial stereotype, reject the racial stereotype, opt out of the question, or choose the middle of the scale.[16] Although this procedure restricts the variance within each category, it allows us to examine whether self-monitoring leads to various forms of tailored responding. The remaining columns in Tables 3 and 4 present the results of multinomial logistic regressions, with endorsement of the stereotype as the excluded (baseline) category. For the lazy stereotype (Table 3), high self-monitors are less likely to choose the midpoint at the mean level of black-white racial diversity, but this reverses as diversity increases and high self-monitors are more likely to choose it in highly diverse contexts (though the interaction does not reach conventional levels of significance, $b = 3.45$, $SE = 2.50$, ns). For the violent stereotype (Table 4), in addition to being more likely than low

[16]Technically, there is not a midpoint to these scales, as there is an even number of response categories—i.e., 1 to 10. Clearly, however, many respondents viewed "5" as the midpoint, as 46% chose "5" for the lazy stereotype. and 38% chose "5" for the violent stereotype. When we refer to the midpoint, this indicates choosing "5" for each item.

TABLE 4 Testing the Self-Monitoring Hypothesis for the Violent Stereotype

		Blacks Are Violent Stereotype		
		Multinomial Logit		
	OLS	**Midpoint vs. Endorse Stereotype**	**Oppose vs. Endorse Stereotype**	**Opt Out vs. Endorse Stereotype**
Egalitarianism	−0.01 (.03)	0.42 (.37)	−0.05 (.42)	1.38 (.51)***
Individualism	−0.03 (.03)	−0.11 (.41)	0.41 (.47)	−0.25 (.55)
Party ID (Republican)	−0.04 (.03)	0.28 (.34)	0.50 (.38)	0.69 (.46)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.06 (.03)**	−0.08 (.35)	−0.93 (.40)**	−0.60 (.46)
Gender (Female)	−0.01 (.02)	0.36 (.20)*	0.05 (.22)	0.11 (.26)
Education	−0.04 (.02)**	0.30 (.20)	0.58 (.23)***	0.66 (.27)**
Self-Monitoring	−0.02 (.04)	−0.04 (.44)	−0.03 (.50)	−1.34 (.64)**
Age/100	−0.12 (.05)***	0.01 (.59)	1.84 (.66)***	0.94 (.79)
Diversity (%Black-%White)	0.09 (.05)***	−1.32 (.57)**	−1.84 (.75)***	−0.05 (.69)
SM × Diversity	−0.63 (.17)***	4.26 (2.59)*	8.31 (2.79)***	6.89 (3.09)**
Constant	0.02 (.01)	−0.31 (.17)*	−0.79 (.20)***	−1.35 (.24)***
R^2	0.06		—	
N	612		707	

Note: With the exception of age (in years), all variables were scaled from 0 to 1. All continuous independent variables were mean centered. The entries are OLS coefficients and maximum-likelihood coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the OLS column, high scores denote endorsing the stereotype.
$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

self-monitors to reject the stereotype under high—but not low—diversity (see Figure 2), self-monitoring also increases the likelihood of choosing the middle value of the scale, but only when diversity is high (see the panels in Figure 3).

We take these results to suggest that social desirability influences the expression of stereotypes among high self-monitors and that this explains (at least in part) why the connections between racial stereotypes and policy preferences are weak among these individuals. High self-monitors tend to tailor their stereotype responses in diverse local contexts by taking the middle value of the scale and by rejecting the stereotype. We argue that this obscures the heightened racialization of whites' racial policy attitudes in diverse residential contexts, a trend readily apparent among those less sensitive to social desirability and normative pressures.

Discussion and Conclusions

The influence of social context on the expression of racial hostility among whites raises a series of difficult questions

about exactly how race shapes contemporary politics. Although much work has suggested that old-fashioned racism has been replaced by equally potent but more subtle forms of racial animus, debate continues regarding how best to gauge the pervasiveness and consequences of racial hostility among whites (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Previous strategies for dealing with this problem have included subtle measures of racial attitudes (Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996; McConahay and Hough 1976), as well as implicit techniques (e.g., Fazio et al. 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). Others have highlighted the empirical challenges in distinguishing new forms of racism from race-neutral considerations, such as ideology and individualistic values (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sniderman and Carmines 1997).

In this article, we expand this line of inquiry by detailing the nuanced circumstances under which stereotypes predict whites' policy attitudes. Specifically, we examine how black-white racial context—in conjunction with individual differences in susceptibility to social-desirability pressures—conditions the link between stereotype endorsement and race-related policy

**Figure 2 Self-Monitoring, Diversity, and Violent Stereotype
Endorsement**

attitudes among whites. On this point, the extant literature provides only limited guidance. On one hand, there is evidence that a "main effect" for racial heterogeneity at some levels—for example, the percentage of blacks in a county—is associated with greater racial negativity among whites (e.g., Branton and Jones 2005; Giles and Buckner 1995). However, in this study, we focus on a different and hitherto unexamined possibility—namely, that racial context may *interactively* amplify the impact of stereotypes on whites' race-related policy attitudes.

In this respect, we broadly expected racial stereotypes to more powerfully influence racial policy attitudes among whites in racially diverse contexts, at least when the content of a stereotype "matches" the content of a policy issue. Importantly, though, we also argue that any interactive effect of this sort may be difficult to detect because diverse residential locations are also likely to be dominated by tolerant norms that can result in the expression of less racial negativity. Thus, in order to better pinpoint the impact of racial context on policy preferences, we examine the intersection of context with an individual difference variable regarding one's susceptibility to social norms—*self-monitoring* (Snyder 1979). Drawing on a long-standing literature, we contend that the moderating effect of black-white racial context on the relationship between stereotypes and relevant policy attitudes is easiest to detect among whites who score low on the self-monitoring scale. They are typically less concerned with the impression they make upon others and rely less on social norms and more upon inner states in formulating preferences (Gangestad and Snyder 2000). In contrast, high self-monitors are more concerned with impression management and more likely to adjust their attitudes and behavior to prevailing social norms, making it difficult to gauge their true attitudes or behavior (Berinsky and Lavine 2012; Terkildsen 1993). Thus, we expect that any tendency for diversity to strengthen the relationship between stereotypes and relevant policy attitudes should be most pronounced among those low in self-monitoring, who are likely to respond to the priming effect of racial diversity but not its normative tendency to elicit racial positivity. In contrast, the impact of stereotypes should be relatively minor among those high in self-monitoring, regardless of context.

On the whole, we find empirical support for these expectations. Among whites *low* in self-monitoring, black-white racial diversity moderates the relationship between stereotypes and policy: low self-monitors who live in racially diverse areas are more likely to rely on racial stereotypes in formulating racial policy preferences. Moreover, these interactive effects are most pronounced in the case of policy issues that "match" a particular stereotype, i.e., the stereotype of blacks as "lazy" in the case of policies designed to assist minorities and the stereotype of blacks as "violent" in the case of capital punishment (see also Gilens 1999). In contrast, among whites *high* in self-monitoring, racial context alters the expression of racial stereotypes, leading them to tailor their responses

FIGURE 3 Self-Monitoring, Diversity, and Responses to Violent Stereotype Endorsement

High=90th percentile; Low=10th percentile.

to stereotype items in ways that may mask the true link between their stereotypes and policy attitudes. Accordingly, we find little moderating effect of context on the relationship between stereotypes and policy preferences among these individuals. These findings underscore the contextualized nature of stereotype expression, suggesting that racial stereotypes have their greatest influence on policy attitudes among whites in diverse zip codes.

Consistent with previous research, our findings reinforce the empirical difficulties in measuring whites' race-related beliefs. In this vein, debate has raged among researchers over the extent to which variables indicative of racial hostility—such as stereotype endorsement—continue to drive white policy attitudes in the United States (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000). This debate has been marked by disagreements not only about how to measure racial hostility, but also about whether common measures of racial hostility that do predict policy attitudes are in fact valid indicators of racial attitudes and beliefs (as opposed to ideology). Moreover, weakness and inconsistency in the observed relationships between various indices of racial hostility and policy attitudes have

produced additional confusion about the continued political relevance of racial attitudes and beliefs (Sears et al. 1997). In this article, we take a different approach. Specifically, we demonstrate that the political relevance of one index of racial hostility—stereotype endorsement—hinges on both racial context and individual differences in susceptibility to impression-management pressures, as well as the fit between particular stereotypes and particular policy issues. As such, our results suggest that the process by which white racial policy views are increasingly racialized in diverse settings is complex.

Our findings have several potentially important political implications. First, geographic variation in racial diversity may condition the effectiveness of race-coded political advertising. Beginning with Richard Nixon's "Southern strategy," racially coded ads related to crime, welfare, "states' rights," and other issues have become a staple of American political campaigns (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Mendelberg 2001). Previous work in political science (e.g., Huber and Lapinski 2006; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002) has treated such ads as either "explicit" or "implicit," depending on whether the racial cue is direct or indirect. However,

the implicit-explicit distinction is a continuum, with ads varying in the extent to which the racial component is disguised. In this vein, our findings suggest that the effectiveness of racial cues may depend on individual differences in responsiveness to tolerant social norms. Specifically, high self-monitors may be turned off by ads in which the racial cue is too obvious or transparent, but they might well be responsive to highly implicit cues (especially to the extent that such cues operate below the surface of awareness; see Mendelberg 2001). By contrast, low self-monitors—those who respond less to social norms than to their own inner states and dispositions—may be less attuned to whether the cue is conveyed in a relatively implicit or explicit form.

Second, our findings suggest that the nature of political conflict over race-related policies is likely to depend on geographic considerations. With respect to state-level politics, for example, political disagreement about welfare benefits, Medicaid, and income-based benefit programs subject to state-level policy variation may be substantially rooted in racial animus in states where blacks comprise a comparatively large portion of the population but have little to do with such debates elsewhere.

We would like to conclude by pointing out a few potentially fruitful directions for future research. First, our data are from New York. Future research should examine the possibility that the effects we highlight here may vary in their intensity in states or regions with different political cultures and histories of intergroup relations. For example, the pattern of interaction we find in the present study may be more pronounced among whites in the Deep South, where blatant forms of racism persist (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). Indeed, as beliefs about blacks are likely to be more cognitively salient in the South than in our New York data, the dynamic we explore here may help to explain why welfare benefits—which are perceived as going primarily to blacks (see Gilens 1999)—are less generous in southern states than in other regions of the country. More research is needed to understand the ways in which racial context and individual differences in sensitivity to tolerant norms complicate the study of white racial attitudes. Only then will race relations scholars extend their understanding of the lingering political impact of racial stereotypes within contemporary American politics.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

- Marginal Effects from Table 1
- Alternative Parameterization
- Alternative Specifications
- Replication with a Transformed Measure of Diversity
- Descriptive Statistics
- Question Wording