Though there were many actors following the death of Gaddafi, the two that emerged in the spotlight were the Government of National Accords (GNA), and the House of Representatives (HoR). The HoR was elected government following the first civil war, though there was only an 18% turnout. The UN led an initiative to to establish the GNA following the post-election violence, in which the islamist General National Congress and the HoR both agreed to unite.
The GNA has a very generalized political scheme and includes only basic democratic principles:
“Ensuring the democratic rights of the Libyan people… based on the principle of the separation of powers, oversight and balance between them… so that they can address the serious challenges ahead, respect for the Libyan judiciary and its independence.”
-Libyan Political Agreement (UNSMIL) [1]
Most of the government’s pull within the population, and internationally, comes from their UN-backing, as well as hatred towards Haftar. With such a lack of national identity, it becomes difficult for the country to unite and stand behind a singular government.
Khalifa Haftar is considered the head of the de facto HoR government. His rule lacks democratic ideals, and instead makes use of fear and militarization, as we have seen with alleged human rights violations and mobilization of the LNA [2]. He also uses his control of many oil terminals in order to gain a better hand at the negotiating table, and gain support of foreign nations.
Libyan Conflict and the Spiral Model of War
The spiral model of war outlines how actors fall into war through a series of misinterpretations of threats, preemptive attacks, and shifts in power. Actions are perceived by one party which in turn creates a reaction; when a state fears for its security, the reaction is typically unwarranted, causing another exaggerated reaction from the other state [3]. Ironically, this back and forth actually decreases each state’s security that they were competing for in the first place. The diagram below goes through the series of events that corresponds to this structure of conflict.
Since the formation of the GNA in 2015, the relationship between these actors has followed a spiral model of war. Using the Second Libyan War as a case study, you can clearly see the anarchy post-Arab Spring, followed by the power competition of waring militias. The actions and reactions then started to spiral: The HoR was reluctant to recognize the GNA as the official government, and perceived a shift in power towards them, being backed by the UN and maintaining control over the capital. Haftar marched his Libyan National Army west, claiming his intentions were to rid the region of terrorists, and eventually attacks Tripoli.
Intractability in the Libyan Conflict
Peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts have had little success in this conflict. The conflict was predisposed to intractability, meaning there is no sound outcome or resolution–though intractability lies on a spectrum, so there is no fully intractable conflict. The competition between the GNA and the HoR has a a high-stakes, win-lose structure. Most conflict of this type, especially with equal balance of power, end up in an entrenched state. Neither side will give in to a solution because it requires them to give up all power, and neither side is capable of completely dominating the other. On top of this, Libya lacks security and national pride, a sense of identity. With this weak state capacity, which is exacerbated by the war, it is no wonder why there is a humanitarian crisis. The government is incapable of providing basic needs to the population.
So what can Libya and the international community due to end, or minimize, such a conflict? On a structural and thematic level, there are some key concepts to implement. The first is to throw away any forms of strategic negotiation. between actors. While mediation of the international community seems required for all conflicts, it sometimes does more harm than good. Actors go into these peace talks and negotiations with the mindset of winning, or gaining power over the others. Instead, mediation should focus on long-term solutions, while identifying all aspects of the conflict.
Next, it is important to implement the idea of reconciliation: Libya must acknowledge its past struggles, understand the timeline for peace is a long road, and work with and understand the opposing sides, as well as the international community. There is hope for Libya, as efforts are being made to implement this type of reconciliation on a social level.
“In Libya, wide-reaching resolution of the underlying causes of conflict is difficult to achieve in the absence of a functioning state. However, informal mediation processes there are managing to de-escalate tension, contain violence, and build bridges between different groups, resolving immediate issues to enable coexistence.” [4]
Finally, everyone involved the conflict needs to change their perspective. They need to understand the value of human lives and human rights on a deeper level. If the actors put humanitarianism above their desire for political power, steps would be made much quicker to end the violence. If empathy was used by political leaders, it is likely they would see the cost of war.
Bibliography
[1] United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Libyan Political Agreement. December 17, 2015. [Online]. Available: https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20-%20ENG%20.pdf.
[2] “General accused of war crimes courted by West in Libya,” The Guardian, 25-Sep-2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/25/khalifa-haftar-libyan-general-accused-of-human-rights-abuses.
[3] R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 167–214, 1978.
[4] R. Clogg and M. Parlevliet, “Reconciliation is not only possible but needed in all stages of conflict,” Reconciliation is not only possible but needed in all stages of conflict | Conciliation Resources, 01-Jun-2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/reconciliation-not-only-possible-needed-all-stages-conflict-0#:~:text=Reconciliation%20involves%20transforming%20relationships%20damaged,relationships%20between%20people%20and%20institutions.