Uredništvo. “Orjuna (Organizacija Jugoslovanskih Nacionalistov) Na Slovenskih Tleh.” Zgodovinski Portal, 9 Mar. 2017, zgodovina.si/namesto-
By Carter McKinzie
Abstract:
This historical investigation aims to look at the metamorphosis of fascist organizations in Yugoslavia during the interwar period and to understand the reasoning behind their emergence and foundational ideology and specifically examines Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA | Organizacija Jugoslavenskih Nacionalista) to understand how rising ethnic and nationalistic tensions rooted in the palingenesis of the South Slavic Movement, with a significant influence from the Serbian Orthodox Church, led to the emergence of paramilitary fascist organizations. Multiple overlying trends, such as the prevalence of these groups to be ethnic, nationalistic, and palingenetic, support this research’s general argument that rising ethnic and nationalistic tensions were instrumental in the emergence of fascist organizations. This study’s analysis of the South Slavic palingenesis and its glorification of Serbian culture, as well as its analysis of the “National Question” whether Yugoslavia should exist as a multi-ethnic united state, reveals this tendency. This study also explores how The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1918-1929) reasoning for existence surfaced because of the palingenesis but also a governance question, which materialized as a result of the Vidovdan constitution that was ratified by a Serbian majority. This materialization greatly upset the well-established Croatian federalist system of governance. In order to illustrate these points, this study will employ ORJUNA as the principal organization. ORJUNA’s complicated ideological system provides an understanding of the major ethnic and national question that emerged at the time as well as the resonation that fascism and nationalism held for many of the proletariat in the state at this time. Through the lens of ORJUNA, this analysis reveals how fascist paramilitary organizations derived influence from religious institutions, long rooted ethnic tensions, and influence from other established fascist states.
Introduction to Significance:
Although ORJUNA, one of the most prominent fascist organizations in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS), is quite understudied, it irrevocably impacted not only the ethnic division that is characteristic of the Balkans, but also on the National Question[i] that bedeviled Yugoslavia until its dissolution. “The National Question”, referenced throughout this paper, is a constant challenge of Yugoslavia reconciling with the diverse ethnicities, religions, and ideologies that exist within the South Slavic Movement. Although many scholars will embrace the popular explanation of Yugoslavia various problems and eventual dissolution as the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences within the Balkans as being incompatible, this research will emphasize understanding why the ethnic identity and diversity were transformed into a subject of contention within Yugoslavia. Within the realm of Balkans scholarship and historiography, there are multiple theories which attempt to explain the fall of Yugoslavia, especially the tragic nature of its fall, including the Bosnian Genocide; however, the majority of these suppositions fail to account for the nationalist and fascist groups that laid a foundation of division among Yugoslavia from its founding. Although this argument does not center itself around the reasoning for the failure of Yugoslavia, a highly contested subject, it does provide a lens in which evaluating the failure can be viewed not through an economic perspective or a Woodwardian[ii] perspective, but through more of an Andersonian[iii] perspective that evaluates the origins of the nationalism that emerges jointly with the South Slavic Movement. This discourse can therefore be viewed from the lens that Yugoslavia lacked something central to its being from the moment of its foundation, and that should have been portentous from Yugoslavs’ support of ORJUNA and later iterations of similar nature such as Zbor, and Ustaša.
Introduction to Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists and Zbor:
Although it may seem that through Yugoslavia’s permutations, SHS, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, nationalism and far-right authoritarianism grew as a result of King Alexander I Karađorđević suspension of the constitution and establishment of a monarchical dictatorship it lies however in the foundational core of SHS with the emergence of the South Slavic Movement and the unilateral decision by Serbia to make SHS a centralist state in direct disregard for the Croats and Slovenes’ previous political system of federalism[iv]. As an indirect result of American president Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point plan, the South Slavic movement was united with former Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Serbia acting as one state; however, the ideal structure of this state drastically deferred contingent upon just one nation, as Serbia envisioned a centralized structure with a substructure of Serbian state tradition. Although Croatia and Slovenia employed Yugoslavism as a device for liberation, national unification, and ultimately the integration of their respective people, and while the established national ideologies of Serbia and Croatia were derived from the traditional empires of the Middle Ages[v], the majority of Croats were not interested in their national autonomy, so Zagreb, Croatia’s government officials, sought a compromise between the preservation of Croatian agency and Yugoslavia as a federalist state. Disparaging this compromise, Serbia viewed federalism as a Habsburg anachronism and that SHS needed to be strongly integrated like those of other strong European states, leading to internal conflict between the founders of Yugoslavia beginning with the Yugoslav Committee and the Corfu Declaration, and as predicted the Habsburg monarchy’s former politicians ardently advocated for a federalist solution, and in stark contrast, Serbs and Montenegrins pushed for a central state. In the dark winter of 1920, a constitutional assembly was elected through an electoral franchise that lacked transparency[vi], leading to skepticism about the ethics of the results. However, in the end, the Democratic Party which advocated for centralism, earned a slim majority. On St. Vitus (a holiday highlighting Serbian Ethnic Pride) day 1921, the assembly cast 223 votes in favor with 196 in opposition, to adopt the draft constitution titled the Vidovdan Constitution.SHS’ constitution contains many elements the most significant in this context being the establishment of a highly centralized state with the motto of “one nation, one king, one state,” which led to mass boycotting[vii] of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Assembly by Slovenes, Croats, and Marxists. Besides the adoption of unitarism and centralism, this adoption undermines the hope of agreement and compromise at the conclusion of World War One, which speaks to the fundamental flaws in the unification of these states that at the ratification of a constitution, such great perturbation occurred. In an attempt to prevent minority groups from being politically silenced, the Corfu Declaration was included, but its implications had little to no effect on protecting the fair representation of minority voices7. Foundationally speaking, this dominance and majority of Serbian culture and ideals does not necessarily direct causation towards the Serbian nationalism that later pollutes all of Yugoslavia, but rather evidently increases the probability of occurrence.
Developing an ardent discontent for Croatian autonomy, Interior Minister Svetozar Pribičević [viii]maintained the presumption that a centralized state was necessary for the success of all nations, specifically SHS, therefore motivating him to create the ORJUNA, the primary goal of which was the petrification and systematic aggravation of Croats. Although it cannot be determined as direct causation, Pribičević’s background as an ethnic Serb does establish a correlation between the century-long Serbian sense of superiority that environed the south Slavic states and the foundational structure of OJUNA, meaning that Serbian ethnic nationalists were reputed favorably. While OJUNA was strengthened in 1929 with the establishment of a monarchical dictatorship, it does contextualize the augmentation of ethnic tension between the different states in SHS and the subsequent rise of nationalist movements during the 1930s. Additionally, its sympathism for Italian fascism substrates the fascist tendencies that emerged during the 1930s Yugoslav nationalist movements, exemplified by how ORJUNA became a strong proponent of corporatism, a key pillar of a fascist political state, under similar justification to those of Tangorra and Stefani of their respective countries.
A key aspect of the writings and thoughts of ORJUNA was to eventually support a revolution of some medium in the SHS; however, not a traditional revolution, but in the sense that the revolution would occur “not on the barricades, but in people’s heads.”[ix] This comment provides an understanding of the foundational aspect of ORJUNA’s purpose, as it aims to employ Gellnen[x] nationalistic devices to psychoanalytically alter the way individuals viewed the SHS, which is something that is quite prevalent during Yugoslavia and its successor states in later years. ORJUNA’s raison d’être was similar in the sense that it aimed to unite individuals and states in some murky attempt to recreate this grandeur of a united Slavic state. Comparatively, ORJUNA also made Marxism, represented mainly by the USSR, an enemy of this movement, illustrating another parallel between ORJUNA’s movement and Italian fascism. To corroborate ORJUNA’s ideological utopia, a variety of cultural contrivances were assimilated into SHS during its time and even posthumously. Considering that ORJUNA embodied a very intellectual sphere that consisted primarily of radical university students, their cultural methodologies and, ultimately, their pedagogies were ones that were traditional of intellectual movements. These ideas were synthesized primarily via the newspaper Pobeda, as the majority of ORJUNA was literate (although that was not necessarily the case for the majority of the SHS) This discussion is rather significant, as the majority of fascist government movements pre-WW2 advocated primarily for a mass revolution involving all members of the state and while ORJUNA is not in direct contention with that statement, they focused more heavily on smaller groups. At the core of this organization were fascist elements that aligned closely with the definition of Paxton[xi] and Griffin[xii] in the sense that it was a paramilitary organization that called upon Yugoslavs to organize to a greater grandeur of the state. While this organization gained various traction growing to 10,000 members at its height (discussed in ORJUNA’s evaluation), it eventually dissolved during the turning point of the decade due to the revocation of the Vidovan and the dismissal of the assembly.
Due to domestic assassinations and political unrest, King Karađorđević formally suspended the constitution, leading to what many have classified as a monarch-fascist regime, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, due to its fascist influences from Italy and Germany. One of the first items that Karađorđević pursued with this new authority was the destruction of the traditional regional identity of the Yugoslav territories in an attempt to create a homogeneous Yugoslav state. Although the monarchial government is not the focus, it does provide the underpinning for many of the Yugoslav nationalist movements in this metamorphosed state and, in certain movements, directly provides support.
Within this newly founded state, a paramilitary group emerged in both the region of Serbia and Croatia known as Yugoslav Action (Jugoslovenska akcija or JA), which is cited as the most radical paramilitary fascist group during the various Kingdoms (SHS and Kingdom of Yugoslavia) lifespan8. While the organization ardently denied any fascist elements, at its core, it simultaneously advocated for an extreme authoritarian corporatist system and vehemently supported the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP | Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). Furthermore, kindred to the symbols found in NSDAP, Yugoslav Action’s symbol was a blue swastika9 often found next to a raised right hand, which cements the influence of national socialism on the state10. In addition, JA members and supporters respected Karađorđević’s regime, and they believed that this was a necessary step to achieve an ideal Yugoslav state that was homogenous and centralized. The ideology that governed this group was clearly very similar to ORJUNA’s ideas and movements, although the individuals who played a part in the respective organizations were different in terms of class and societal role. Although Yugoslav Action was active as an independent organization until the end of World War 2, it collaborated with Zbor in terms of ideological beliefs and nationalistic sentiments. Bringing together the ideologies of Yugoslav Action, Boj (Združenje borcev Jugoslavije or Association of Fighters of Yugoslavia), and Buđenje, the Yugoslav National Movement, was conceived in 1935 (January 6) with Dimitrije Ljotić[xiii] elected as the president of the organization.
The Case of ORJUNA:
At its beginning, ORJUNA was attractive to most those in middle-class SHS who aligned themselves with Yugoslavism with the belief that this type of nationalist identity will capitulate a greater more successful state. In this discourse, some of the important demographics within the middle-class population is the strong tendency for high school and university students to participate in ORJUNA’s activities, along with former World War 1 soldiers to join ORJUNA as well.[xiv] Emerging in Split in 1921, the organization quickly became notable for its violent tendencies and fascist resemblance to movements like Squadristi, from whom ORJUNA members derived their national ideology and structure and principally provided the corporatist economic model. At its founding, the primary demographic that comprised ORJUNA was primarily Serbian veterans from the Austrian-Hungarian Army and the Serbian Army. This shared military background is significant, not only considering the organization’s violent tendencies, but also as many of the members were still living on the frontline of the Great War. The minds of the soldiers were then still consumed with the violent brutality that characterized the daily life of many ORJUNA members. The war ideology of the group largely embodied the ideal of a spiritual nationalist revolution that would materialize from the “ voice of our blood[xv].” Inherently, in the foundational ideology of ORJUNA, the fascist aspects become evident in the revival of a myth of purification and edification of the state through nationalistic force. A principal causation for ORJUNA’s motivation for a homogenous state lies partly in SHS’ newfound makeup of many non-Slavic ethnicities, as after the Great War, the state now maintained 2.1 million non-Slavic population out of 12.1 million total SHS’ population, which was approximately 20 percent of the state’s population. Furthermore, in newly annexed territories, the non-Slavic ethnicities often made up more than a quarter of the population, as in Kosovo, Albanians made up 50.4 percent of the population, while in Vojvodina, Hungarians composed 24.8 percent of the population13.
Coupled with the new non-Slavic population, the clash between Serbs and Croats regarding the Vidovdan Constitution led Yugoslavia into a state of semi-permanent national insecurity. Since the Vidovdan allowed Alexander I such great authority, Alexander I aligned with the Serbian influence in Belgrade, directly leading to the suspension of any parliamentary ventures from non-Serbian parties to incorporate more equitable participation of non-Serbs in governance. After the inauguration of this new state, most Croats and Slovenes were fired from their administrative duties, and many Serbs who took their place were often unqualified[xvi]. The continuation of non-Serb oppression became evident in this new united south Slavic kingdom, and laid the foundation for ORJUNA-inspired genocidal movements in the 1990s under Slobodan Milošević, the former President of Serbia and the individual who oversaw the Bosnian Wars and subsequent genocide. Through the various political and social maneuvers instituted by the monarchy, Serbian political parties, and the proliferation of which in some instances, SHS began to embody a national ideology of Serb superiority within its centralist system of governance. Within this ethnic motivation, the fascist elements of ORJUNA’s ideology began to emerge, as ORJUNA began to support exclusionary policies for the SHS’ government, where those who do not fit in the model laid out by Alexander I were marginalized through harassment and persecution. Although ethnic nationalism is not necessarily widespread within SHS at this moment in time, the development of exclusionary domestic policies began crystallizing the myth that allows for ethnic nationalism. By supporting these exclusionary policies, the initial development of Serbian palingenesis began to take form to more broadly provide justification for the exclusionary policies that now characterized SHS and Alexander’s monarchy. Glorifying Serbian gallantry, Kosovska Djevojka14is a cultural element that played a significant role in all the Yugoslav republics during the interwar period and can be utilized as a valuable cultural source in this discourse. Kosovska Djevojka (19th century) is a work of Serbian epic poetry that highlights the tragedies and the valor of the Battle of Kosovo (1389). While the epic poem does not explicitly mention Serbs, it is widely known[xvii] that the characters depicted represent Serbian soldiers, in particular to highlight the valor of Serbs. For example, “Gde je tvoje srce, Tamo ti je vitez”[xviii] (“Where your heart is, There is your knight”, lines 15-16) speaks directly to the argument of the Vivodan Constitution of Serb ethnic superiority. It is apparent within these lines underlying tones of Serbian excellence, considering the Serbian soldier’s unwavering loyalty to their knights and their enduring spirit during this fatal battle. Throughout the interwar period, this epic poem would often be sung by ORJUNA and other fascist paramilitary groups, and phrases would often be shouted at rallies held by the organizations. While this epic poem has existed for centuries in Serbian culture, its popular re-emergence in SHS reveals multiple tendencies within ORJUNA’s population. Kosovska Djevojkae serves as a cultural mediator between Serbian history and the present, as it underscores important themes of Serbian excellence and glory. Considering that this poem was sung at rallies and other ORJUNA-sponsored events, the constant repetition of these ideals seems to live in the minds of Yugoslavs, whether it be consciously or unconsciously, speaking the deeply rooted ideologies that environ Yugoslav culture, even in the contemporary. Within this specific cultural device, the participation of ordinary participants was praised, mobilizing larger demographics for nationalistic support.
Considering the ardent Serbian nationalistic rhetoric that becomes apparent throughout cultural elements found throughout SHS, it seems that there is not only historical ethnic presupposition against Croats, but also a long-lasting mythic belief in the psychological differences that Serbs saw between themselves and Croats. Capturing the perceived psychological and racial ideological differences, Croatian poet and essayist Antun Gustav Matoš describes the two ethnic groups as quite polarizable:
“The Croats want to live. The Serb is ready to die. . . . The Croat, as an intellectual, wants to know, perceive, understand, and criticize more and more and is, as a result, more contemplative, forgive more, reacts less, and is more of a skeptic, almost a cynic rather than a fanatic. He feels himself superior even when he has fallen low because intellectualism leads to relativism and inactivity. Perhaps he is a great moralist because he has so little moral strength. The Serb is not a moralist, but he has strong morality, the morality of activism and of reacting, and the morality of atonement and revenge. His aim is not to understand everything but to be able to do more. Croatdom represents statics, Serbdom dynamic. Croatdom is the potential, and Serbdom is the kinetic energy of our people. Croatdom is reflection, Serbdom is action.”15[xix]
During the early emergence of the South Slavic movement (1880-1910), Matoš established several ethnoracial heterogeneities between the two dominant groups based on the fundamental values of valor and courage, which Serbian culture historically valued greatly due to its Orthodox influence deriving from the Battle of Kosovo and the sacrificial acts that religious figure Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović[xx] undertook during the Battle, which elevated him to the status of a saint in the writings of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Over the development of the Balkans and South Slavic culture and traditions, Hrebeljanović became the epitome of Serbian nationalism and the ideal Serbian due to his glorification from the Church[xxi]. Considering the roots of Matoš’s verse from a fascist perspective, it seems that the origins of Serbian nationalism in SHS maintains a relationship to fascism’s palingenetic mythic core[xxii], as the continual apotheosis of Hrebeljanović establishes that Serbianism should root back to the glory of its former state, which existed hundreds of years prior. In the case of Matoš, the poem highly praises Serbian nationalism and inherent values while disdaining those of Croats, the other major ethnic group in SHS, under two major forms of criticism. The first is an ardent critique of Croat government, ideologies, and society, as it seems Matoš had a fundamental issue with Croat’s federalist mode of governance and sided more with the Serbian school of thought in governance and social ideologies, even though Matoš was ethnically Croat. Elevating Serbian nationalism, the critique substantiated the same Serbian argument that allowed for SHS to be governed by a centralist system, which lies in the thinking that Serbian ideals and propositions are inherently superior to those of others, and ultimately augmented membership and belief in the ideals that far-right groups were proposing in SHS like ORJUNA and later Zbor[xxiii]. which were the Serbian ideal of Yugoslavism. Additionally, it is important to note some of the psychobiological differences that Matoš fabricates between Serbs and Croats such as describing the Croats as “static” while praising the Serbs for being “dynamic”[xxiv]. Matoš’s description of Through this detail of Matoš’s verse, two things become apparent: from historical formalist criticism, there are drastically different meanings, with the description of Croats connoting a sense of incompetence and lack of ability to be productive within a state, speaking to the Serbian view that Croats were incapable of governing a state like SHS. In contrasts, the description of Serbs elevates their abilities and ethnocentric ideologies, which speaks to the viewpoint that Serbs were active and able to get things done in a nation, which would benefit the state.
However, this criticism that Matoš lays out was not only the thinking of a small population, but rather Matoš’ concerns and critique calling into question SHS’ existence, introducing the National Question in SHS and subsequent permutations. There was also questioning on the mode of governance the Kingdom should adopt after the ratification of Vivodan Constitution, along with the role of national or ethnic identity in this new state, leading to extremism on both sides, where, in some cases, pre-genocidal ideologies were recorded.
Although this type of nationalistic fascism was less seen during the course of SHS, ORJUNA still came vis-á-vis with the violent characteristics of fascism during the Congress meeting in Split in November of 1922[xxv]. The notable aspect of this “Congress” was the ardent denunciation of the Croat Peasant Party and its prominent leader, Stjepan Radić, describing them as a threat to Yugoslav unity within the SHS and undermining state stability. This “Congress” is much more comprare to a modern far right authoritarian rally that would often be seen under Mussolini or some modern Hungarian far right candidates categorized by powerful speeches and loud yelling and often a level of chaos. Speaking from a more factual perspective, there was very little statistical or actual evidence that supported Korolija’s claims during the rally. The basis on which Korolijia was situating his argument were the Croat uprisings during the adoption of the Vidovdan Constitution, despite the fact that the goal of the Croat protests was not to abandon the roots of the South Slavic Movement, but rather to advocate for their federalist perspective within the Assembly. However, it was an undue influence that led to this argument gaining widespread belief among Yugoslavs. Consequently Korolija’s rhetoric inflamed many of the Croats in attendance, and in Split, Croat Nationalist Groups were greatly angered, groups of which that emerged in the first place as a result of the ratification of the Vidovdan Constitution. Towards the end of the rally, violence erupted between ORJUNA members and Croats within Split’s center, pushing the Gendarmerie (Žandarmerija), a police organization under the the Royal Army of SHS tasked with keeping law and order in the Kingdom, to intervene. Although the physical effect of the violent outbreak did not cause much physical damage to the people or the city of Split, the ethnic division seared deeper into SHS and greatened the differences between Croat and Serb ideologies. Commonly in today’s time, individuals associate fascism with the horrific genocide led by Adolf Hitler or the horrors of the Libyan Genocide under Mussonli; however, fascism does not necessarily need to involve widespread violence, but rather smaller instances of violent conflict like that seen in Split. The creation of an endogroup, the Serbs, and an exogroup, the Croats, fosters the ethnocentrism which fascism precisely thrives on, especially within this context. It must be noted that the violence in Split cannot be attributed to the creation of the National Question or the question of Yugoslavism; in contrast, it is the cumulation of the several sub-arguments that allowed for the creation of this organization.
Throughout the short state of SHS, ORJUNA developed rapidly in response to the National Question that emerged, despite shortly collapsing to the fascist dictatorship and transforming into the Yugoslav People’s Movement. While ORJUNA’s role in the fall of SHS was significant, it can also be considered as a lens for other fascist groups when situated into the broader context, especially considering the Yugoslav fascist groups that emerged during Milošević’s regime; however, that is not objective of this discourse. Although ORJUNA and other prominent fascist groups in early Yugoslavia cannot be attributed as direct caution for Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s, the underlying questions that caused these groups to emerge still plagued Yugoslavia until its fall. The question of whether or not these various ethnic groups could co-exist as one state was a question that materialized with the South Slavic movement and underpinned the collapse; however, this analysis will urge scholars to not accept that as the popular and easy answer; instead, this paper has consulted that fascist groups and nationalistic ideologies manipulated these ethnic and cultural differences to cause disruption and create and subsequent deepen cultural divides. In later Yugoslavia under the Former President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia demonstrated that coexistence was possible with different cultures and ethnic background when ethnic nationalist was push aside; however, after his tenure ended, Yugoslavia lost that unifying force that brought together the South Slavic Movement. Considering the long-rooted ethnic divisions that have been manipulated not only by ORJUNA and Zbor but also the Croatian Fasicst group, Ustasa, which shortly governed Yugoslavia Under the name of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as a satellite state for Germany during World War and participated in the genocide of 300,000 Serbs, it seems that Yugoslavia’s collapse can at least be correlated with the manipulation of cultural differences that long characterize the Balkans. Following their exit from Yugoslavia, Croatia enacted a series of anti-Serb policies to discourage Serbs from living within their border, demonstrating that these ethnic divisions were not single faceted. While this paper’s goal is not to analyze modern politics in the region, it demonstrates the continuity of the ethnic tensions being manipulated in the Balkans. Therefore, citizens, states, and organizations must exercise great caution when grounding movements in nationalistic ethnic identities, as history demonstrates how easily such identities have been exploited to justify exclusion, conflict, and violence.
Appendix I:
- 25
This image is quite similar to Yugoslav’s Actions; the only difference is YA would have a fist pumping into the air next to it. At the time that this was present in SHS or the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the primary intention was not anti-semtic but rather just inherently fascist.
20
- 26
Represents the commitment to the proletariat while also upholding Serbian ideals and values.
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[viii] Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia.
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[xiii] Ljotić was formerly the Minister of Justice under Karađorđević; however, he resigned after the King rejected his fascist judicial system.
[xiv] Cyprian Blamires, and Paul Jackson. 2006. World Fascism : A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara (Calif.): Abc-Clio.
[xv] “Program Jugoslovenske napredno-nacionalne omladine; integralni nacionalizam” [The Program of the Yugoslav Progressive- Nationalistic Youth; The Integral Nationalism], Pobeda, 15 October 1921, 1.
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[xviii] “Kosovska Djevojka” [The Maiden of Kosovo], in The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems, translated by Charles Simic (New York: Guggenheim Museum, 1987).
[xix] Antun Gustav Matoš, “Mi i oni,” Sabrana djela, vol. 14 (Zagreb, 1973), pp. 88-89.
[xx] Serbian Orthodox Church, “Troparion and Kontakion for Saint Lazar,” in Service Book of the Holy Prince Lazar (Belgrade: Serbian Orthodox Church Publishing, 2005), 32-33. (The Synaxarion, Kontakion, and Troparion all praise Hrebeljanović as a Saint and heavily establish, since 1389, the importance of Hrebeljanović and provide specific actions that he took that the Serbian Orthodox Church highly valued.)
[xxi] Referring to the Serbian Orthodox Church (1219).
[xxii] Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 1.
[xxiii] Refer to Zbor’s Symbol in Appendix 1-B
[xxiv] Antun Gustav Matoš, “Mi i oni,” Sabrana djela, vol. 14 (Zagreb, 1973), pp. 88-89.
[xxv] “Prvi kongres Orjune u Splitu: saopštenje o zaključcima kongresa” [The First Congress of Orjuna in Split: The Report about the Conclusions of the Congress], Pobeda, 12 November 1922, 1.